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Abstract
From 1906 until 1931, Manchuria – Northeast China - was a complex patchwork of
Chinese, Japanese, and Russian spheres of control. Since political authority was fragmented,
none of the governments was capable of establishing a central bank with a monopoly over the
money supply. Multiple currencies were in use, ranging from strings – tiao- of traditional
Chinese copper cash, to silver dollars (yuan) from Mexico, China, and Japan, to Russian rubles
(which crashed in value after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution), and miscellaneous paper
currencies of varying stability. The modern banks established under national and private
auspices to serve the commercial needs of the burgeoning economy found themselves without
central regulation, resulting in an unusual situation of competitive “free banking.” This case is
interesting as an example of rapid economic growth despite the costs of a chaotic monetary
regime. Historical sources, including the Chinese Maritime Customs reports, contemporary
yearbooks, and the South Manchuria Railway (Mantetsu) research reports, indicate that the
combination of modern and pre-modern currencies and financial institutions managed to serve
the needs of the different elements of society, from the tiny household purchases made in copper
coins, to large commercial transactions made in silver ingots, or silver dollars, or in silverbacked
yuan notes. Furthermore, there were well-established informal credit practices, based to a
great extent on personal relations – guanxi – that circumvented much of the need for modern
financial instruments.
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Currencies, Identities, Free Banking, and Growth in Early Twentieth Century Manchuria
Thomas R. Gottschang
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I. Introduction
2
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Early twentieth century Manchuria - “the Cockpit of Asia” - was the site of multifaceted
conflict: Conflict over political and military control between the weak Chinese state and the
imperialist forces of Japan and Russia, and conflict between modern economic institutions and
traditional Chinese practices. Each of these conflicts was paralleled in Manchuria’s maze of
currencies and financial markets, which reflected the political objectives of the modern
competitors, and the resilience of pre-modern Chinese monetary institutions, as well as the
monetary needs of the rapidly growing economy. Prasenjit Duara has commented that
4

“Manchukuo appears as a place of paradoxes,” and this is also true of the earlier monetary
situation, which was chaotic and inefficient, yet in practice proved capable of supporting strong
growth in the Manchurian economy. This paper will focus on the period from the beginning of
the twentieth century, when new railways brought Manchuria into the modern world, to 1931,
when the Japanese military seized control of all Manchuria, and moved quickly to establish a
centralized modern monetary system. During these years, the traditional Chinese currencies,
based on silver and copper and supported by pawn shops, “money shops” (qian zhuang ), and
Shanxi remittance banks, operated alongside modern banks established by Europeans,
Americans, Chinese entrepreneurs and governments, and Japanese companies. By the 1920s, the
modern banking sector constituted a fascinating example of the phenomenon of “free banking,” a
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situation in which banks function under little or no regulation, issue their own paper currencies,
and are constrained only by the forces of market competition.
From 1906 until 1931 Manchuria was a complex patchwork of Chinese, Japanese, and
Russian spheres of authority. Northern Manchuria was dominated by the Chinese Eastern
Railway, which remained under Russian control until the Russian Revolution of 1917. In the
1920s the railway was managed by a joint Chinese-Soviet board, but it became a subject of
dispute and finally the cause of an undeclared border war between China and the Soviet Union in
1929. Meanwhile, Japan held the Liaodong Peninsula, the South Manchuria Railway, the strip of
land through which the SMR ran, and a host of smaller rail lines, mines, and other industrial and
commercial projects.
In addition to Russian and Japanese enterprises, there also emerged a growing number of
railways under Chinese control, including the important Beijing-Shenyang line. In addition, most
commerce, agriculture, and light industry were Chinese-owned, and the civil government and
military forces in all but the leasehold areas were also Chinese. The Chinese government was
not, however, the national government, but the Fengtian government, the regime of the warlord,
Marshal Zhang Zuolin. When Zhang was assassinated in 1928 by elements of the Japanese
5

Army, he was succeeded by his son Zhang Xueliang, the “Young Marshal,” who was driven out
of Manchuria with his troops by the Japanese Army in the so-called “Manchurian Incident” of
1931.
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Table 1. Major Currencies Circulating in Manchuria, 1929
Exchange rate per
100 silver yuan
yuan 100

Currency
Circulation area
All Manchuria
Silver yuan (dayang qian) - silver dollar
coins issued by central government,
generally stable
yuan 100
Liaoning Province and
Silver yuan piao (dayang piao) – dollar
along the railways
notes issued by various banks based on
silver yuan coins, generally stable
Feng piao - yuan notes issued by
yuan 6,000
Liaoning Province
Manchurian government, very unstable
Harbin dayang piao - silver yuan notes
yuan 140
Harbin and Chinese Eastern
issued by Harbin banks, fairly stable
Railway Zone
yuan 140
Heilongjiang Province
Heilongjiang dayang piao – silver yuan
notes issued by Heilongjiang Province
government, generally stable
Jilin Province
Jilin Guan Tie – notes based on strings of Tiao 20,000
copper cash, issued by official bank of
Jilin Province, fairly stable
yuan 145
Jilin Province
Jilin Yongcheng dayang piao – silver
notes issued by official bank of Jilin
Province, fairly stable
yuan 114
All Manchuria
Xiaoyang qian (jiao) - silver coins
smaller than 1 yuan, issued by provincial
mints, debased but relatively stable
Guandong Leased Territory
Yokohama Specie Bank silver yen notes yen 100
(Liaodong Peninsula), SMR
- issued by Yokohama Specie Bank
Railway Zone
branches in Manchuria, stable
Guandong Leased Territory,
Bank of Chosen (Korea) gold yen notes yen 100
SMR Railway Zone
- issued by Bank of Chosen branches
under Japanese supervision, stable
Sources: Sakatani, Manchuria, pp. 20-31. See also “The Currency situation,” in Chinese
Economic Journal 1, 5 (May 1927); Hitano Kenichiro, The Japanese in Manchuria, pp. 265338.
Note: The “normal” exchange rate for the silver yuan was 0.50 U.S. dollar and 1.00 Japanese
yen.

II. Currencies and Identities
Manchurian Identity
The currencies in circulation in Manchuria in the early twentieth century reflected the
recent histories and current conditions of the nationalities that issued them. The identity of
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Manchuria itself was complex and ambiguous. Although formally a region of China, even its
Chinese officials, led by Zhang Zuolin, challenged the authority of the Chinese national
government, while both Russia and Japan openly asserted elements of sovereignty in the areas
under their control. There were also deep divisions in modes of economic activity and culture,
ranging from the nomadic herding lives of the Mongols in the northwest, through the traditional,
intensive agriculture practiced by millions of Chinese farm families in the central and southern
plains, to the industrial lives of most Japanese, Russians and many urban Chinese. This diversity
was reflected in the range of currencies in use, from the ancient form of silver “shoe” ingots,
which were still used in rural and border areas as a means of storing value and for major
6

transactions, to modern paper currencies, issued by the banks of China, Japan, and Russia. A
Russian author noted in the early 1920s that, “A characteristic trait of the currency problem in
North Manchuria was and remains the fact that foreign monies – Russian roubles [sic.] in the
beginning, and afterwards Japanese yen – widely circulated here simultaneously and side by side
7

with Chinese specie.”

Chinese Identity
The most complex identity in the Manchurian ethnic mix was that of the Chinese, who
made up the great majority of the population. The southern end of Manchuria had been inhabited
by Chinese farmers since the earliest periods of Chinese civilization and Chinese administrators
8

and soldiers had formed part of the Manchu force that conquered China Proper in 1644. The
Chinese population of the early twentieth century consisted primarily of farmers and laborers,
9

millions of whom had immigrated from the North China provinces of Shandong and Hebei. As
in other parts of China, the population also included traditional merchants and artisans, as well as
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people engaged in modern administrative and economic activities, including mining, industry,
railways, modern commerce, and modern financial institutions.
Most of the currencies in Manchuria were Chinese and reflected China’s extensive
monetary history, as well as the unstable and fragmented political condition of the country, and
the economy’s long process of adjustment to modernity. The major traditional currencies were
the silver “shoe” ingots, known as yuan bao or yin ding, and the copper coinage which originated
as the ancient form of the round copper “cash” or qian, commonly strung on cords through the
square holes in their centers and exchanged in units of “strings” or tiao, which were little used by
10

the 1920s. The traditional currencies were not effectively standardized. The silver ingots came
in different sizes, weights, and quality of silver. Their value was given in terms of liang, Chinese
11

ounces of pure silver, rendered in English as “tael,” a term of possible Malay origin. While the
Chinese ounce – the liang – was officially set at 37.8 grams by the Republican Government, the
tael varied in definition. The most widely used tael measures were the Haiguan or Customs tael,
at 32.797 grams (583.3 troy grains) of silver, and the Kuping or Treasury tael, used by the
Beijing Central Government, at 37.31 grams (575.83 troy grains). In addition, major ports and
commercial centers often used their own local tael measures, including those of Shanghai,
12

Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Yinkou. The value of the strings – tiao – of copper cash was
determined by their content of copper, which was often adulterated; the number of coins on a
string, which was commonly set at 1,000, would be reduced when coins were removed for
exchange fees, or to allow for a shortage of currency in a particular locality. In the late
nineteenth century, several provinces in North China considered a tiao to contain around 500
13

cash, while a standard tiao in Manchuria at the same time was only 160 cash.
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Modern Chinese currencies included silver dollar coins (yuan), silver subsidiary coins
(jiao), and the copper coins without holes known as tong yuan or tong zi, which were first
produced in South China near the end of the nineteenth century and had nearly replaced the
traditional copper cash coins by the 1920s. The relationship between the copper and silver coins
14

fluctuated with the market values of the two metals. Paper currency was issued by various
official and private Chinese banks in Manchuria, the most important based on the silver coinage
and generally referred to as yang piao, or “foreign notes.” Notes were also issued, primarily in
Heilongjiang and Jilin, based on the modern copper coinage, called tong yuan piao, and on the
tiao, strings of the traditional copper cash, called guan tie. Notes based on the subsidiary silver
coinage, called xiao yang qian – “small foreign coins” – were also issued by some merchants and
qian zhuang, traditional banks or “money shops.”

15

The best-known of the Chinese paper currencies in Manchuria was the Fengtian dollar, or
feng piao. These were yuan notes first issued in 1917 by the Three Eastern Provinces Bank on
behalf of the Fengtian Provincial Government in a well planned effort to stabilize the currency
situation. In the early years of their existence, when around 20 million yuan were believed to be
in circulation, the feng piao were securely supported by reserves and became the most widely
16

accepted notes throughout Manchuria. Beginning in 1922, however, as Zhang Zuolin’s armies
engaged in military conflicts with his rivals in China Proper, the number of notes issued rose
exponentially, reaching an estimated total of over 3 billion yuan by the end of 1929. Since the
notes printed after the early issues had no real backing, their value rose and fell with Zhang
Zuolin’s fortunes, but eventually declined to an exchange rate of 11,800 yuan in feng piao to 100
17

yuan in silver in 1930.
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The widely diverse elements of the Chinese monetary system in Manchuria reflected the
equally diverse economic characteristics of the Chinese population, which was pulled between
the reliable, time-tested practices of China’s past and the efficient but not necessarily reliable
ways of industrial society. While the money supply included modern instruments, such as the
Fengtian dollar, originally backed by loans from the Japanese Bank of Chosen , and later
buttressed by bond issues, it also retained some of the most ancient forms of Chinese money.
And while no single element of the pre-modern system served well all three of the functions of
modern money – medium of exchange, store of value, unit of account – the functions were
performed by the system as a whole. The silver “shoe” ingots, which were inconvenient for
commerce and inconsistent in value were still regarded by many farmers as the most reliable
means of saving the value of their soybean crops. At the smallest end of the currency range, the
copper coins and paper tiao notes met the modest daily purchasing needs of much of the
population, while the partially modern tael measures served quite effectively as accounting
currencies for much of the region’s large scale commerce and government financial transactions.
One of the most interesting of the Manchurian currencies was the Yinkou Transfer Tael,
a purely book-keeping unit that apparently originated in the nineteenth century in the port of
Yinkou, whose position at the mouth of the Liao River before the arrival of the railways made it
the main shipping center for the already burgeoning soybean trade. With supplies of silver
currency inadequate for the volume of trade, warehouse merchants developed the practice of
crediting soybean freight haulers with the value of the beans they delivered from the farming
areas in tael units, and transferring that value to other merchants as requested in payment for
18

merchandise for the freighters to haul north on their return trips. This was a sophisticated
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system that demonstrated the ability of Chinese merchants to circumvent obstacles to trade on a
large scale.
The relationship between Chinese economic identity and currency is particularly evident
in the Chinese term, da yang qian, “big foreign (western) coin,” commonly used for the silver
yuan coin which was the basis of the Chinese national and provincial currencies of the early
twentieth century. In the course of China’s lengthy process of adjustment to the intrusion of
western economic and cultural power into East Asia, the round silver dollar coin was one of the
earliest western imports to be readily adopted in the Chinese economy, along with the New
World crops of maize, peanuts, and potatoes. Spanish silver dollars came to China from the
Phillipines in the 16th century, followed by Mexican dollars in the nineteenth century, along with
the British dollar from Hong Kong and India, the American trade dollar, and the Japanese yen.
The new coins largely replaced the traditional silver ingots in commercial transactions because
they were lighter, easier to use, and more standardized. By the late nineteenth century silver
dollars were being produced by Chinese mints, and in the early twentieth century were coined by
19

the central Government and by provincial governments in Manchuria. The identification of the
silver dollar as a foreign and specifically western - “yang” – style coin may be seen as a sign of
Chinese reservations about adopting practices of the imperialist, “barbarian” powers, despite
their practical advantages.
The unfortunate history of the Fengtian dollar also serves as a metaphor for the civil
administrations of Chinese warlord governors. Like several of the warlords, Zhang Zuolin
employed competent civil administrators and made serious efforts to promote economic
development in southern Manchuria, including the carefully and realistically planned
introduction of the feng piao as a means of monetary stabilization. Ultimately, however, just as
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the overall effect of warlord rule in China was to stifle economic growth, so Zhang’s military
ambitions took precedence over prudent monetary policy, causing the feng piao to plummet in
value, disrupting financial markets all over Manchuria and exacerbating the currency chaos it
had been introduced to resolve.

Russian Identity
Beginning in the late 1890s, Russian workers, engineers, technicians, administrators, and
military personnel were brought into Manchuria to build and operate the Chinese Eastern
Railway and to administer the railway zone and the towns through which it passed. Russian
officers and engineers also operated a large fleet of steamships on the Songhua and Heilongjiang
Rivers. Harbin was established as a base for the railway and remained predominately a Russian
town, with Russian merchants, banks and currency until the late 1920s. Russia's dominance over
railway development in Manchuria was brief. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the RussoJapanese War in 1905, awarded Russia's rights over the Liaodong Peninsula and the South
20

Manchuria Railway line between Changchun and Dalian to Japan. In 1930 there were 140,554
21

22

Russians in Manchuria. By 1937 their numbers had declined to around 60,000.

The Russian currency was the ruble, which came in the form of a gold coin, a paper
credit ruble backed by gold, and subsidiary silver and copper coins. When the Chinese Eastern
Railway (CER) first began construction in the late 1890s, the Chinese laborers and suppliers of
materials required payment in silver dollars. As the Russian presence increased in size and
economic activity, rubles became increasingly acceptable, and after 1903 became the dominant
currency of commerce in the area along the CER and northern Manchuria, except during the
Russo-Japanese War. The ruble’s popularity was fatally damaged, however, first by the effects of
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the First World War, and more decisively by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. After 1917 the
Czarist – or Romanoff – ruble was joined by Kerensky rubles issued by the Provisional
23

government, and Siberian rubles from the Siberian government.

All lost their value, to the

dismay of many migrants. A large proportion of the money that migrant workers and merchants
carried home to Shandong early in the century was in the form of rubles because many had found
work on the Russian railways. According to the Longkou (Shandong) Customs report for 1917,
the fall in the value of the ruble -- from 66 coppers in January to 10 coppers in December -- "has
brought the once wealthy emigrant to the verge of bankruptcy and has seriously affected the
24

prosperity of every village in the district." The situation for the ruble improved once the Soviet
government established the official Dalbank in 1922, with an office in Harbin. New gold ruble
notes were issued and began to gain acceptance until 1929, when tensions erupted between
Chinese and Soviet authorities over the CER, causing the ruble to lose value again and to largely
25

be displaced by Japanese currency.

The fortunes of the ruble closely coincided with the national status of Russia, which was
for the most part more focused on its internal political and social crises than on expansion.
Although the ruble quickly became an important part of the money supply in northern Manchuria
in the early years of the century, it was repeatedly shaken by political upheavals and finally
disappeared from the region, as did the Russian population.

Japanese Identity
When Japan acquired the South Manchuria Railway and the Liaodong Peninsula, the
Japanese counterpart of the Russian migration brought thousands of Japanese technicians,
administrators and other urban workers to southern Manchuria. By the end of 1937 there were
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nearly 400,000 Japanese living in the towns and cities of Manchuria. Japanese intentions for
Manchuria were far more ambitious than those of Russia. The most important agency for
Japanese colonization in Manchuria was the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR), which
27

described itself as "the carrier of the light of civilization into Manchuria," and operated a wide
range of modern enterprises including hotels, harbors, a shale oil distillation plant, the Anshan
28

iron works, and a host of public institutions including schools, hospitals, and research facilities.
In addition to plans for industrial development, the Japanese government persistently
sought to settle large numbers of Japanese farmers in Manchuria. Official programs for mass
immigration from Japan were planned, beginning in 1914 with a scheme for subsidized
settlement of former Japanese soldiers in the SMR zone and culminating in 1936 with the

29

adoption of a grandiose twenty-year plan to locate five million Japanese farmers in Manchuria.
In each case detailed surveys were carried out in the prospective settlement areas, the farmers

received subsidies of money, land, equipment, seed, and livestock, and supporting facilities such
30

as training institutes and research centers were established. Even after such painstaking
preparations, however, the numbers of Japanese farm families who went to Manchuria never
reached the plans’ goals, and those who made the move to rural Manchuria found a harsh
environment and an agrarian economy thoroughly dominated by Chinese farmers and merchants.
For the Japanese civil authorities and business leaders in Manchuria, the yen and the
modern Japanese banking system constituted an important element of the new, “civilized”
economy and society that they were creating in Manchuria. The yen coins and notes were firmly
backed by gold and silver and were much more stable than the Chinese currencies. Indeed,
Japanese merchants and business organizations were openly contemptuous of the Fengtian dollar
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even in its early, stable years, and took steps to destabilize it, very possibly as part of an
31

officially backed campaign to make the gold yen note the dominant currency in Manchuria.

An aspect of the Japanese monetary system in Manchuria that was especially reflective of
Japan’s ambitions in the region was the role of the Bank of Chosen (Korea), which was founded
in Korea with Japanese funding for the purpose of helping to operate Japan’s colonial
administration. The first major Japanese bank to operate in Manchuria was the Yokohama
Specie Bank, which began issuing silver yen notes at its office in Yinkou in 1903. As
Manchurian trade with Korea grew after completion of the link between the Manchurian and
Korean rail systems in 1911, the Bank of Chosen opened offices in the major Manchurian cities
and began issuing gold yen notes. In 1917 the Japanese government decided that the Bank of
32

Chosen would be the sole issuer of gold yen notes in the Japanese controlled territories. Thus
the very name of the bank that issued Japanese currency invoked the imperialist posture of the
Japanese government.

III. “Free Banking” in Manchuria
Modern banking arrived in Manchuria at a time when political authority was fragmented
and incapable of establishing a central bank with a monopoly over the money supply. The
numerous banks established under national and private auspices to serve the commercial needs
of the burgeoning economy therefore found themselves without central regulation, resulting in a
situation of “free banking.” There is an extensive and informative theoretical and descriptive
literature on historical situations in which banks have issued their own currencies and operated as
33

market competitors with little or no regulation. In this kind of system, banks profit by issuing
notes – paper currency – which pay no interest and by using the hard currency received for the
notes as the backing for interest-bearing loans. The catch for the bank is that in order for its notes
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to be accepted and held, they must be readily redeemable for hard currency – usually precious
metal – on demand. Thus it behooves a bank to always retain a cushion of hard currency reserves
in order to respond to any redemption demand, while at the same time trying to maintain as high
a level of outstanding loans as possible to generate profits.
In several respects the Manchurian banking sector closely resembled other historical
cases of free banking. One of the most thoroughly studied cases of free banking occurred in
Scotland, from 1716 to 1844 when there was no monopoly central bank. During this period
private banks issued their own currencies and actively competed with each other for the deposits
of customers by touting their reliability. Agents of the banks raised the competitive pressure by
buying each other’s notes and presenting them for redemption, increasing the need for reserves
34

and threatening the spector of depositor runs on inadequately stocked banks. In Manchuria,
Japanese efforts to denigrate the Fengtian dollar, while undoubtedly motivated by imperialist
goals, may also be seen in the light of classic free banking currency competition. And it is worth
noting that as long as the Fengtian dollar was securely backed it remained stable. It was only
when Zhang Zuolin demanded note issues beyond prudent reserve support that the downward
spiral of inflation took place.
Another feature of historical cases of multiple-currency free banking was the emergence
of secondary markets for bank notes, in which dealers bought and sold the notes of different
banks, earning profits by exploiting differences in the notes’ values, which reflected the
reliability of their respective banks. Markets of this kind, which functioned in the United States
before the Civil War, provided expert information to the public about the soundness of banks,
35

through the different discounts applied to their notes. Similarly, currency exchange was a
thriving business in Manchuria, for the pre-modern currencies, as well as for bank notes. A
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Russian author commented that, “one of the particular consequences of the unsteadiness of
monetary circulation is represented by an endless number of special enterprises in the country,
36

which are exclusively engaged in the money exchange business. ....”

There were several aspects of the Manchurian currency markets that differed markedly
from most cases of free banking and derived from the clashes of national power and of
modernity with tradition that characterized Manchuria in this period. In most recorded cases of
free banking, “a single ‘outside’ base money serves both as a unit of account and as a medium of
37

redemption and interbank settlement....” In Manchuria no single monetary standard existed
before 1932, as illustrated in Table 1. The various political authorities that exerted sovereignty
over portions of the region each employed its own hard currency. In Heilongjiang, it was the
gold Russian ruble, in the areas dominated by Zhang Zuolin’s government it was the Fengtian
dollar, backed by both gold and silver, in the concession zones of the South Manchura Railway it
was the silver yen and the gold yen. Throughout Manchuria the silver yuan of the central
government of China was an accepted standard, and individual provinces had their own currency
standards. In addition, hard currency in Manchuria included the ancient forms of copper cash and
silver ingots, both of which endured in the currency markets until 1932, and both of which
served as redemption bases for note issues.

IV. Currency Chaos and Economic Growth
The costs of Manchuria’s fragmented and unstable currency situation were clear to all
observers and participants in the economy. The American-trained economist, Franklin Ho,
recalled his experience with currency conversions in Manchuria in the late 1920s:
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. . . when I was carrying out field investigations in Manchuria on the problems of
migration, I found that Manchurian currency differed from city to city and place
to place. I started out with a $10 national bank note, and exchanged it for local
currency at each of the places where I stopped. When I got back to Tientsin I
exchanged it again for national currency. In the process of exchange the ten
38
dollars in national currency was reduced to two dollars.

An official of the Chinese Eastern Railway complained that the currency exchange
institutions in Manchuria, “... are extracting, in the first place, enormous amounts out of the
productive commercial intercourse – for their proper maintenance; in the second place, they are
increasing the selfcost of commodities and products, because every enterprise is obliged to take
39

into account the expense involved in the exchange of currencies ....”

One of the most interesting conclusions of historical studies of free banking systems
around the world is that most of them functioned quite well. Similarly in early twentieth century
Manchuria, although many transactions required conversions between currencies with attendant
fees, and involved risk of devaluation and consequent altering of costs or revenues, nonetheless,
the economy showed remarkable growth and vitality. The lower cost of railway and steamship
transportation opened new markets for traditional Chinese products like peanuts, eggs, and
40

sesame seeds. The most dramatic growth occurred in the soybean trade. By 1929 Manchuria
41

produced 61 percent of total world soybean output. Many of the jobs migrants obtained were
directly related to the soybean trade, in farming, transportation, or oil pressing, while thousands
of others worked in service trades supplying everything from shoes to meals for the bean
workers. Railway freight tonnage in Manchuria grew from 2.14 million tons in 1901 to 36
million tons in 1931, for an annual average growth rate of nearly ten percent. Over the same
period, total net foreign trade valued in 1913 haiguan taels grew from 98.32 million to 380.65
42

million, for an average annual growth rate of 4.6 percent. Even if the freight and trade figures

Manchuria Currencies

18

are calculated on a per capita basis to allow for the growth of population due to migration, there
was still strong positive development over the three decades as illustrated by Figures 1 and 2.
How could such a rapid growth rate take place in an economy plagued by the inefficiencies of
the Manchurian monetary system?
Figure 1. Manchuria's Railway Traffic: Freight Tons Per Capita,
1891-1931
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Figure 2. M anchuria's Total N et Trade Per C apita, 18911931
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The answer seems to lie in two areas: First, while none of the individual components of
the Chinese monetary system was adequate in and of itself, the combination of currencies and
financial institutions managed to serve the needs of all elements of society, from the daily
household purchases made in copper coins, to the large transactions in soybean shipments, made
in silver ingots, or silver dollars, or in silver-backed yuan notes. Furthermore, there were
financial intermediaries that specialized in each level of transaction, from the small exchange
needs in street markets, to pawn shops and traditional banks, to modern banks. Second, there
were well-established informal credit practices, based to a great extent on personal relations –
guanxi – that circumvented much of the need for modern financial instruments. The operation of
the Yinkou Transfer Tael system is an example. In this case the soybean freight hauler granted
the warehouse owner credit in accepting a ledger entry in exchange for a load of beans, and in
doing so obviated the need for an amount of silver currency equal to the shipment’s value, or for
a formal loan or contract agreement. Russian observers of the upstream end of the soybean trade
recorded similar relations of considerable trust between soybean farmers, local buyers, and interregional wholesalers. The local buyer would pay the farmer for the crop long before it was
harvested, again granting very substantial credit, equivalent to a futures contract, but with no
written agreement. When the buyer collected the crop, it would in turn be entrusted to a
wholesale dealer, again on credit, with the payment not being received until the shipment had
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been processed, transported, and sold.

Furthermore, the introduction of modern banking was to a great extent complementary to
the traditional financial system, rather than entirely in competition with it. Modern banks did not
provide the very small scale services that pawn shops and “money shops” engaged in, while the
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traditional institutions were incapable of supplying the volume of funds required for modern
industrial investments. In more than one instance the modern banking system prevented financial
crashes that the traditional banks could not handle on their own.
There is no question that the Chinese currency system in Manchuria was inefficient and
wasteful. It was not, however, ineffective. Like much of the Chinese economy, it managed to
accomplish significant results using largely traditional methods. And while the Japanese
authorities were certainly correct in believing that the economy could be more productive with a
sound, modern monetary system, they were incorrect in believing that the traditional system was
“uncivilized” or unsophisticated.
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